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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the first transnational terrorist attack by Al-Shabaab in Kampala, 
Uganda, on July 11, 2010. It provides a historical background of Al-Shabaab since its 
inception and the group’s major chronological events from 2006 to 2010. The study then 
analyzes the factors that may have contributed to Al-Shabaab joining the transnational 
arena to strike hundreds of miles away from Somalia. 
Among the findings of the study is that the recruitment of foreign fighters by Al-
Shabaab from different parts of the world materialized into the recruitment of Ugandans 
who acted as a local franchised cell inside Uganda. It was that cell that was responsible 
for the Kampala bombings. Moreover, the local franchised cell had logistic support links 
with other terrorist cells outside Uganda. In addition, porous borders facilitated the 
perpetrators to easily enter Uganda with all the materials that were used in the bombing. 
Recommendations include that, together with intensifying human intelligence 
among the indigenous population in Uganda, the East African Community has to 
establish a strong counterterrorism agency incorporating all member states for 
information sharing in order to thwart cross-border terror networks. 
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A. FOREIGN TERRORISTS AGAIN AFTER THREE DECADES 
In 1976, Ugandans experienced an ordeal with foreign terrorists when Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorists flew in with hostages aboard Air France 139 and 
held them for weeks at Entebbe.1  The hostages, mostly Israelis, were rescued by Israel 
Defense Forces Commandos in a dramatic, well-executed mission that showed much 
competence and served as a deterring mechanism to other terrorists groups. However, 
after 34 years, foreign terrorists again entered Uganda, this time due to Uganda’s role in 
Somalia. 
On July 11, 2010, Al-Shabaab carried out twin suicide attacks in Kampala, 
Uganda against people watching a soccer match, leaving 78 people dead and 89 injured.2  
These were the first terrorist attacks by the group outside Somalia, qualifying Al-Shabaab 
as a transnational threat in the region. Since 2007, Uganda has been leading the African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), with the assistance of Burundi.  Both countries 
contribute a contingent force of about 9,000 troops based in Mogadishu.3  As a result, Al-
Shabaab has embarked on a provocative strategy of deterring countries involved in the 
efforts to pacify Somalia by targeting their cities to compel them to withdraw from 
Somalia. 
Al-Shabaab feels threatened by the presence of peacekeeping forces, so it has 
continued to demand their complete withdrawal from Somalia. Notably, terrorist groups 
such as Al-Qaeda have pursued their objectives by using any tactic at any cost. Likewise, 
Al-Shabaab is being joined by foreign fighters from Western countries, Asia, the Middle 
                                                 
1 John Arquilla, From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1996), 335. 
2 Major-General Kale Kayihura, “Annual Crime and Traffic/Road Safety Report-2010,” Uganda 
Police, 11, http://www.upf.go.ug/Reports/Annual%20Report%202010%20Final%20(Launch).pdf 
(accessed June 20, 2011). 
3 African Union Crisis Committee, “Study Guide,” Nottingham International Model United Nations 
Conference 2011,” 7, http://www.nottsmun.org/PDF/AU.pdf (accessed November 15, 2011). 
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East and Africa,4  so its capability to strike again cannot be underestimated. One impetus 
is to help facilitate the rise of an Islamic caliphate and ease pressure on them mounted by 
the AMISOM troops. Second, there are large numbers of Somalis living as refugees in 
East African countries that Al-Shabaab can recruit to its ranks. Figure 1 is a map of 
Somali refugees in the region as of June 2010. Therefore, Uganda currently faces both 
internal and external strategic challenges; hence, there is a need to coordinate regionally 
for this challenge. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Map of Horn of Africa Showing Number of Refugees.5  
                                                 
4 David Shinn, “Al Shabaab Tries to Take Control in Somalia,” Foreign Policy Institute, November 5, 
2010, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/201011.shinn.somalia.html (accessed December 02, 2010). 
5 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullmaps_af.nsf/luFullMap/F3661AFA34291ED785257745006F424B/$File/m
ap.pdf?OpenElement (accessed January 4, 2011). 
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B. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to suggest a feasible solution to the current 
transnational threat of Al-Shabaab against Uganda. The scope of this research is to 
identify the factors that enabled the change in the locus of violence of Al-Shabaab from 
national to transnational. Consequently, the study will recommend strategies to ideally 
minimize the transnational threat against Uganda from Al-Shabaab. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
By looking at Al-Shabaab’s evolution into a transnational threat, this research will 
answer the following questions: What are the contributing factors that enabled Al-
Shabaab to succeed in carrying out its first transnational terrorist attack? Consequently, 
what courses of action should the Ugandan government and security forces consider 
adopting to prevent another successful attack against innocent civilians? 
D. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AL-SHABAAB 
It is important to understand the historical background of Al-Shabaab since it 
provides an understanding into the current status of this terrorist group. 
In January 1991, after the overthrow of Dictator Siad Barre, the Somali central 
government collapsed, creating a political vacuum that saw the rise of many Islamic 
militant groups and warlords, especially in Mogadishu, Somalia.6  Among the militant 
groups was the Al-Iltihad Al-Islami (Islamic Union), which by then had the highest 
number of militias and was active till the mid-90s.7  In 1996, some members of these 
militant groups later established the Sharia Courts in Somalia.8  In 2001, the U.S. 
government listed Al-Iltihad Al-Islami as a terrorist organization and froze all its assets 
                                                 
6 Ken Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia,” International Security 31, no. 3 
(Winter 2006/07): 78–81. 
7 Ted Dagne, “Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace,” The Congressional 
Research Service, (December 16, 2010), 4, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=12490 (accessed January 4, 
2011). 
8 International Crisis Group, “Somalia’s Islamists,” ICG Africa Report, no. 100, (December 12, 2005), 
3. 
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with “Executive Order 13224,” which almost led to the demise of the group.9  In 2003, 
Al-Iltihad Al-Islami held a conference in the city of Las Anod in Northern Somalia where 
its leadership and young members disagreed on the outcome.10  The young members later 
formed the “Mujahideen Youth Movement” (MYM), also known as Harakat Al-Shabaab 
al-Mujahideen. Today, the group is famously called Al-Shabaab, a “Salafi-jihadist 
movement,” and is a major player and instigator in the ongoing fighting in Somalia. The 
top leaders of the new faction were Aden Hashi Ayro, killed in May 2008 by an 
American missile strike; Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Abu Mansoor, who headed Al-Shabaab 
from 2008 to 2009; and Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubayr, who led the group from 2009 to 
2010.11  
In 2004, Al-Shabaab emerged as the militant wing of the Islamic political power 
called the Islamic Courts Union (ICU).12  The ICU was an alliance of Islamist groups and 
local Sharia Courts that united to form a rival administration against the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG).13  This network of Islamist militant groups eventually fought 
for and controlled most of Southern and Central Somalia until late 2006, when it was 
dismantled by the invasion of Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) in support of 
the TFG. As the remnants of the ICU sought refuge in Asmara, Eritrea, the leadership of 
Al-Shabaab reorganized the strewn militias and, thus, continued fighting ENDF. In 
September 2007, in order to end the antagonism of opposing factions, the ousted ICU 
members held a dialogue in Asmara and formed the Alliance for the Re-liberation of 
Somalia (ARS), which was headed by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, the current president of 
                                                 
9 International Crisis Group, “Somalia’s Islamists,” 3. 
10 Cody Curran, “Global Ambitions: An Analysis of Al-Shabaab’s  Evolving Rhetoric,” Critical 
Threats, February 17, 2011, http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/global-ambitions-analysis-Al-Shabaabs-
evolving-rhetoric-february-17–2011 (accessed March 23, 2011). 
11 David Shinn, “Al Shabaab’s Foreign Threat to Somalia,” Orbis 55, no. 2 (April 1, 2011): 206, 
http://www.proquest.com.ezproxy.members.marshallcenter.org/ (accessed April 15, 2011).  
12 Michael Taarnby and Lars Hallundbaeks, “Al-Shabaab, the Internationalization of Militant 
Islamism in Somalia and the Implications for Radicalisation Processes in Europe,” (February 26, 2010), 
11–12, 
http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/Forskning_og_dokumentation/Forskningspulje/Taarn
by-rapport.pdf (accessed December 20, 2010). 
13 Ibid. 
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Somalia.14  However, Al-Shabaab boycotted the dialogue and its leadership called for 
attacks on the ARS, arguing that the latter had failed to adopt the norms of global jihadist 
ideology; hence, violent fighting ensued between the groups.15  The moderate elements of 
the ARS finally left Eritrea and merged with the TFG in Djibouti to take part in the UN- 
sponsored negotiations. Some other extremists who continued the war against the TFG 
joined Al-Shabaab and others formed Hizbul-Islam, another Islamist organization in 
Somalia.16  Al-Shabaab promotes an authoritarian form of “Salafi” Islam that stresses an 
inflexible interpretation of the Quran with an aim of overthrowing the current legitimate 
government and implementing Sharia law.17  The group claims to be waging jihad against 
the "enemies of Islam." 
In February 2008, the United States and several Western governments designated 
Al-Shabaab as a foreign terrorist organization.18  In September 2008, the group tried to 
join the international terror arena, and in late 2009 Al-Qaeda commanders in East Africa–
like Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, involved in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya 
and Tanzania–joined the top leaders of Al-Shabaab.19  Today, Al-Shabaab is thought to 
be affiliated with other international terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Al-
Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP). However, the leaders of the group denied having 
ties to Al-Qaeda until early 2010 when they proudly declared a connection.20 The 
                                                 
14 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Madeleine Gruen, “Understanding Al-Shabaab,” Foundation for 
Defense Democracies, November 04, 2009, 
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11787129&Itemid=326 
(accessed April 12, 2011). 
15 Dagne, “Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace,” 21. 
16 Christopher Harnisch, “The Terror Threat from Somalia: The Internationalization of Al-Shabaab,” 
Critical Threats Project, (February 12, 2010), 3, 
http://www.criticalthreats.org/sites/default/files/pdf_upload/analysis/CTP_Terror_Threat_From_Somalia_S
habaab_Internationalization.pdf (accessed April 12, 2011). 
17 Ibid., 14–17. 
18 Stephanie Hanson, “Al-Shabaab,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 10, 2011, 
http://www.cfr.org/somalia/Al-Shabaab/p18650 (accessed August 30, 2011). 
19 Bill Roggio, “Suicide Bomber Detonates inside Somalia’s Presidential Compound,” The long War 
Journal, September 20, 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/09/suicide_bomber_deton.php 
(accessed January 28, 2011). 
20 Tim Lister, “Fertile Territory for Al-Shabaab in Chaos of Somalia,” CNN, November 01, 2011, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/11/01/world/africa/Al-Shabaab-guide/index.html?hpt=hp_c2 (accessed 
November 01, 2011). 
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estimated strength of Al-Shabaab is said to be not less than 14,000 members, including 
both local Somalis and foreign fighters.21  The “emir” of Al-Shabaab is Sheikh Ibrahim 
Al-Afghani, who replaced Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubayr (also known as Ahmed Abdi 
Godane) in December 2010.22  
The group funds and coordinates three types of missions. First, Al-Shabaab 
envisions an Islamic state in the form of a caliphate in Somalia to be achieved through 
Jihad against the TFG, which is seen as an ally of the Western countries.23  Second, the 
group seeks to compel the withdrawal of AMISOM forces and international intervention 
from Somalia.24  Finally, the group seeks the return of the “Somali-inhabited” lands of 
Ogaden and the North Eastern Province in neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya, 
respectively.25  
Currently, the group is said to control most parts of Southern and Central 
Somalia, including a big portion of Mogadishu as shown in Figure 2, where Sharia law 
has been imposed.  Were it not for African Union (AU) peacekeepers, Somalia’s U.N.-
backed TFG, which clings tenuously to control, would have been defeated by the terrorist 
group.26  Since its inception, the organization had limited itself to national terrorist 
attacks; however, due to Uganda’s and Burundi’s participation in AMISOM, Al-Shabaab 
                                                 
21  Dahir Alasow, “Somalia: Report on Al-Shabaab Military Force,” Suna Times, May 06, 2011, 
http://www.sunatimes.com/view.php?id=564 (accessed November 16, 20011). Also see African Union 
Crisis Committee, “Study Guide,” 10. And Micha Zenko, “Somalia: Kenya’s Invasion and Objectives,” 
Council on Foreign Relations, October 27, 2011, http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2011/10/27/somalia-kenyas-
invasion-and-objectives/ (accessed November 16, 2011). 
22 Daniel Berhane, “What’s Next for Dahir Awey, Hizbul Islam?/Inside Al-Shabaab Camp,” January 
15, 2011, http://danielberhane.wordpress.com/2011/01/15/whats-next-for-dahir-aweys-hizbul-islam-inside-
Al-Shabaab-camp/ (accessed on April 21, 2011). 
23 Abdulkadir Abdirahman, “Teenage Al-Shabaab Soldiers in Training,” Demotix News, October 29, 
2010, http://www.demotix.com/news/495081/teenage-Al-Shabaab-soldiers-training (accessed 15 February 
2011). 
24 Georg-Sebastian Holzer, “Al-Shabaab’s Regionalization Strategy,” ISN Security Watch, July 16, 
2010, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?id=118877 (accessed December 
17, 2010). 
25 Shinn, “Al Shabaab Tries to Take Control in Somalia.” 
26 ICG, “Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support,” Crisis Group Africa Report, no. 
170, (February 21, 2011), 17. 
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seeks to conduct operations in those countries. On 7/11, Al-Shabaab carried out its first 
transnational terrorist attack in Kampala, Uganda. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Map of Somalia Showing Area Controlled by Al-Shabaab.27  
                                                 
27 Katherine Zimmerman, “Map of Islamist–Controlled and Areas in Somalia,” Critical Threats, May 
31, 2010, http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/somalia-conflict-maps-islamist-and-political (accessed 
November 14, 2011). 
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E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Conceptual Literature 
Historically, transnational terrorist activities have been carried out by non-state 
actors against states in order to compel the latter to yield to the demands of the former.28   
This coercion mechanism has been used by terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda to pursue 
its ideological objectives in accord with the 1998 fatwa by encouraging attacks directly 
against Americans and allies with the expectation that cumulative graphic casualties 
would prompt the U.S. to withdraw from the Middle East, in particular Saudi Arabia.29  
The change of the loci of violence from national to transnational is an expansion of the 
terrorists’ network. As John Arquilla says, the “age of terror is driven by an 
organizational race to build networks.”30  In the literature, a number of authors have 
argued that this transition is not automatic, but it is enabled by several factors that are 
embraced by a terrorist group. These mainly include popular support, recruitment of 
foreign fighters, franchised cells, and porous borders. The author will explain each factor 
and show the effect of each in the case of Al-Shabaab. 
Kristopher Robison, Edward M. Crenshaw, Craig Jenkins, and Audrey Cronin 
point out that a number of terrorist operations succeed because of popular support.31  
Cronin further argues that terrorist groups succeed in carrying out an attack in a foreign 
country either with “active support” or passive support” from the indigenous population.32  
                                                 
28 William H. McRaven, SPEC OPS Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and 
Practice (New York: The Random House Publishing Group, 1996), 335. 
29 Usama Bin Laden, “Jihad against Jews and Crusaders,” PBS News online, February 23, 1998, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1998.html (accessed October 30, 2010). 
30 John Arquilla, “It Takes a Network: On Countering Terrorism While Reforming the Military,” 
Testimony before the House Armed Service Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and 
Capabilities on September 18, 2008, in Lessons for Countering Al qa’ida and the Way Ahead (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010), 61, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=21473 (accessed 
January 5, 2011). 
31 Kristopher K. Robison, Edward M. Crenshaw, and Craig J. Jenkins, “The Ideologies of Violence: 
The Social Origins of Islamist and Leftist Transnational Terrorism,” Social Forces 84, no. 4 (June 2006): 
2012–2014, http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?hid=7&sid=d1d6b716-
e33e-4dcd-af2c-65c5ffd323bc%40sessionmgr11&vid=9 (accessed February 10, 2011). Also see Audrey 
Kurth Cronin, “How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” International Security 
31, no.1 (Summer 2006): 27. 
32 Cronin, “How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” 27. 
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Examples of active support include hiding terrorist operatives, raising finances, and 
volunteering to join the terrorist group. Passive support includes actions such as 
unwillingness to collaborate with security institutions.33  In this thesis, the author intends 
to find out how much support Ugandans and the Somali community/refugees in the 
region rendered to Al-Shabaab prior to 7/11. If the support was critical, then it would be 
logical for Uganda to consider courses of action that target these communities; notably, 
the numbers of Somalis in the region who are fleeing the fighting in their country are 
very large. 
Andrew Philips argues that foreign fighters in a terrorist group are crucial for an 
attack beyond its normal boundaries.34  In 2006, in the Province of Anbar, Iraq, foreign 
fighters were at the core of those who initially controlled the population; they worked as 
volunteers, undertook martyrdom operations against the U.S. and its allies, and provided 
financial connections on a monthly basis to the Islamic world.35  In the case of Al-Qaeda 
in Iraq, foreign jihadists were contact points through which other terrorists would 
illegally enter Iraq from Syria and Jordan, using mosques and safe houses along the 
Euphrates river valley that allowed jihadists to move to Baghdad through Ramadi.36  In 
November 2005, Anbar province became a command post from which Zarqawi directed 
jihadists to bomb US owned hotels in Amman, Jordan.37  Phillips further argues that the 
decline of both the inflow of foreign fighters and support of the Sunni population were 
contributing factors to why Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) lost Anbar province in 2007.38  In the 
literature, Al-Shabaab is said to have links to foreign fighters through its leadership. 
                                                 
33 Cronin, “How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” 27. 
34 Andrew Phillips, “How AQI Lost Iraq,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 63, no.1 (March 
2009): 65–66, http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ (accessed January 21, 2011). 
35 Frederick W. Kagan, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq- How to Understand it: How to Defeat it,” The Weekly 
Standard 012, no. 48 (September 10, 2007): 3, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/043delki.asp?page=3 (accessed 
December 29, 2010). 
36 Kimberly Kagan, “The Anbar Awakening: Displacing Al-Qaeda from its Stronghold in Western 
Iraq,” The Institution for the Study of War and Weekly Standard, (March 2007), 2–5, 
http://www.understandingwar.org/files/reports/IraqReport03.pdf (accessed December 29, 2010). 
37 Scott Macleod, “Behind the Amman Hotel Attack,” Time World, November 10, 2005, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1128209,00.html (accessed January 23, 2011). 
38 Phillips, “How AQI Lost Iraq,” 65. 
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Notably, the former leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane (Abdul Zubayr), trained in Afghanistan 
and fought along with the Taliban in the 1990s.39  This thesis will thus explore the degree 
of influence of foreign fighters on Al-Shabaab. 
Peter Chalk and Glenn Robinson argue that transnational terrorist attacks occur 
when there are “franchise” cells of one or two people in the targeted country.40   One 
example is Morocco, where “a local cell carried out five simultaneous bombings of 
Western targets in Casablanca in May 2003 that left forty-five dead.”41  Robinson further 
elaborates that such bombings are carried out by local terrorist operatives in diaspora 
communities. Interestingly, members of cells are immigrants who often have lived in the 
targeted country for many years, while other cell members are citizens by birth of the 
targeted nation. For instance, 
The 2004 train bombings in Madrid that killed 191 people were carried out 
primarily by expatriate Moroccans; most of them had lived and worked in 
Spain for years, and the July 2005 suicide bombings in London that killed 
fifty-two people were perpetrated by three native-born British Muslims 
and a convert from Jamaica who had lived in Britain most of his life.42  
Chalk, meanwhile, explains that terrorists will always take advantage of 
ungoverned borders. He argues that many “borders in the Eastern African corridor are 
porous and subject to little if any control.”43  One example is the poorly secured 424-mile 
Kenya-Somalia border stretching to the Indian Ocean.44  Chalk also highlights that in 
2004 Al-Qaeda successfully penetrated into the Jebel Kurush mountain range northeast of 
                                                 
39 Dagne, “Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace,” 5. 
40 Glenn E. Robinson, Jihadi Information Strategy: Sources, Opportunities, and Vulnerabilities, in 
Information Strategy and Warfare: A guide to Theory and Practice, eds. John Arquilla and Douglas Borer 
(New York: Routledge, 2007), 96–98. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Peter Chalk, “Trends in Transnational Terrorism and Implications for U.S. National Security and 
U.S. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 9 (September 2007): 772. 
http://web.ebscohost.com.libproxy.nps.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?hid=14&sid=5fa70922–3f6e-484e-
9cba-c4f2aec46df0%40sessionmgr15&vid=4 (accessed February 11, 2011).  
43 Peter Chalk, Case Study: The East Africa Corridor, in Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and 
Reducing Terrorism Risks (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 157, 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10225489 (accessed February 14, 2011). 
44 Jamestown Foundation Briefs, “Al-Shabaab Expands Operational Zone with Kampala Bombing-
But to What End?” Terrorism Monitor VIII, no. 28 (July 16, 2010): 2, 
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_008_61.pdf (accessed January 12, 2011). 
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Sudan that runs parallel to the Red Sea and managed to set up training camps because of 
the lack of border control. Moreover, according to Chalk, the security in East African 
airports is weak, with no computerized networks to manage the immigration process. In 
this thesis, the author intends to examine the state of Uganda’s border to the east with 
Kenya because it is likely to be a transit route for terrorists into Uganda. 
Martha Crenshaw and Gabriel Weimann point out that in this era of technology 
many types of media are of use to terrorists, even across borders.45  Internet and cell 
phones have eased coordination and communication. The Internet has especially been 
used by terrorists to recruit, fundraise, and spread radicalism. Crenshaw also argues that 
many bombs are remotely detonated by cell phones. Thus, access to technology can 
accelerate terrorist activities. According to Weimann, in January 2004: 
A federal grand jury in Idaho charged a Saudi graduate student with 
conspiring to help terrorist organizations wage jihad by using the Internet 
to raise funds, field recruits, and locate prospective U.S. targets—military 
and civilian—in the Middle East.46  
On the other hand, terrorist attacks succeed when terrorists or insurgents penetrate 
and conceal themselves among the indigenous population of a targeted country. This 
makes any countermeasures difficult because it is hard to detect and target such terrorists 
or insurgents. However, Gordon McCormick argues that such success is brought about by 
an information advantage.47  McCormick, in his conceptual model known as the “Mystic 
Diamond,” attests that the side with the information advantage will always accomplish its 
mission. In this study, the author will use the “Mystic Diamond” to analyze the Kampala 
bombings case study to show how the terrorists’ hard information advantage accelerated 
the bombings, and how the Uganda government can use the model to isolate the terrorists 
for easy targeting and deny them information from the population. 
                                                 
45  Martha Crenshaw, “How Terrorism Decline,” Terrorism and Political Violence 3, no. 1 (Spring 
1991): 73. Also see Gabriel Weimann, “How Modern Terrorism uses the Internet,” Special Reports, 
(March 2004), 5, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr116.pdf (accessed November 02, 2010). 
46  Weimann, “How Modern Terrorism uses the Internet,” 8. 
47  Gordon McCormick is a Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Defense Analysis 
Department, Monterey, California, U.S. Also see Gordon McCormick, “Mystic Diamond,” Irregular 
Warfare Class Notes, Summer Quarter, 2010. 
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However, not everyone agrees with such an approach. For instance, Glenn 
Robinson argues that repression of terrorist groups in their own territory by military force 
can have the effect of exporting the terrorist problem to another country. For instance, 
Russian military intervention in the second Chechen War seemed to increase the Chechen 
resistance, thus resulting in more terrorist attacks in other parts of Russia.48  In contrast, 
Audrey Cronin argues that military repression has caused the decline and end of groups 
like the Shining Path of Peru in 1992.49  In this study, the author will explore how each of 
these author’s arguments, which are summarized in Table 1, apply to Al-Shabaab. 
 
 
Table 1.   Authors’ Hypotheses about Transnational Terrorist Attacks. 
 
                                                 
48 Robinson, Jihadi Information Strategy: Sources, Opportunities, and Vulnerabilities, 96. 
49 Cronin, “How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” 30. 
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Worth noting is that in the literature, a number of analysts underestimated Al-
Shabaab’s capacity to deter international intervention by striking beyond the borders of 
Somalia. However, the heinous attacks of 7/11 demonstrated the group’s ability to 
conduct transnational attacks. Therefore, in this thesis the author intends to explore this 
gap and find out what factors contributed to the success of Al-Shabaab. 
2. Empirical Literature 
In an effort to identify factors that may have enabled Al-Shabaab to carry out the 
twin bombings on 7/11, this thesis will examine the empirical data related to the typology 
presented in Table 2 to test the theories of the authors in Table 1. Arguably, presence of 
franchise cells, porous borders, popular support in the diaspora and other opportunistic 
factors combined may increase the likelihood of transnational terrorist attacks. For the 
case of Al-Shabaab, the author will use the timeline of the group’s events in Chapter II to 
trace and find out how the three independent variables contributed to Al-Shabaab’s 
success on 7/11. 
F. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS 
In this research, the dependent variable is the transnational terrorist activity of Al-
Shabaab. A transnational terrorist attack is when a terrorist attack is planned from one 
country and executed in another. The indicators of a transnational attack that will be 
considered are the number of terrorist operatives, financial contributions by the 
sympathizers, and the number of other supportive organizations in the targeted country. 
In the case study of Al-Shabaab’s attacks on 7/11, operational effectiveness will be 
measured in three forms. The first measurement will be the number of operatives in Al-
Shabaab. The more operatives the group has in the targeted country, the higher the 
probability for an attack to take place. The operatives can be used to penetrate the local 
population of the targeted country to specifically identify targets and later become suicide 
bombers as the means to achieve the end. Thus, by having an estimate of the number of 
Al-Shabaab operatives in Uganda, it should be possible to predict the degree of 
effectiveness of the terrorist group. The second measurement will be the financial support 
to Al-Shabaab operatives by the local population inside Uganda. The author argues that 
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when there are local sympathizers contributing financial aid to facilitate terrorist 
operatives to live anonymously in the targeted country, the terrorist attacks will more 
likely occur. The third measurement will be the level of active or passive support given to 
Al-Shabaab by other Islamist organizations in Uganda, such as sanctuaries. If there are 
supporting movements inside a targeted country, there are more chances for that country 
to suffer from transnational terrorist attacks. 
This thesis will specifically look at the interaction of three variables (the Somali 
community, porous borders, and franchised cells): 
• The Somali community in the region 
These are Somalis living or born in the targeted country as refugees or recent 
migrants. Support in the diaspora in monetary terms will be measured by financial 
support from the Somali community both before and after the 7/11 attacks. Secondly, 
diaspora support will be measured by the number of recruits joining Al-Shabaab from 
Somali communities in the diaspora and from Somali refugee camps, both before and 
after 7/11. 
• Porous borders 
These are territorial borders that not only allow the smuggling of devices used in 
terrorist attacks, but also allow the infiltration of operatives into the targeted country. 
This variable is signified by the number of Somalis that entered Uganda, both legally and 
illegally, as shown in Figure 1. Another indicator is the amount of explosives/devices 
being smuggled into the country. 
• Franchised cells 
These are two or three extremists sharing the same ideology as the terrorist group. 
This variable will be evaluated in terms of the number of operative cells in the targeted 
country. There is a high likelihood of a transnational terrorist attack taking place if 
operatives are in the targeted country. 
Therefore, in this study the author will examine the likelihood of a transnational 
terrorist attack in regard to the increase in size of the Somali community, the increase in 
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the number of franchise cells, and the porousness of borders with Uganda. He will then 
determine which variable is most important. However, worth acknowledging is that there 
could be other variables that may have enabled Al-Shabaab to succeed on 7/11. 
 
 
Table 2.   Typology of Transnational Terrorist Attacks.  
G. METHODOLOGY 
The author intends to use qualitative theory testing techniques to determine the 
contributing factors that enabled Al-Shabaab to perpetrate attacks beyond the borders of 
Somalia for the first time. Using Al-Shabaab’s timeline of events from 2006 to 2011, the 
author will determine which key event occurred before and after the twin bombings in 
Kampala on 7/11 and if there is a relationship amongst them. Since theory testing 
identifies the extent of conditions likely to be relevant while applying the technique of 
process tracing to clarify the relationship between events and timing,50  the author will 
determine which events occurred simultaneously, or in the same timeframe, and probably 
affected one another. Lastly, the author will find out which key event was crucial for the 
transnational attack. 
                                                 
50 Andrew Bennett and Alexander George, Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences 
(London: MIT Press, 2005), 75. 
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H. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
In this chapter, the author has proposed that the general problem faced by Uganda 
as part of the African Mission in Somalia is both internal and external. The author 
examined the theories from which hypotheses have been derived. The author has also 
shown the evolution of Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization.  Chapter II introduces the 
hypotheses and explains how each independent variable affects the dependent variable. 
This is where the author will reveal which variable was most important in regard to the 
transnational attacks on 7/11. Consequently, the author will come up with intervening 












II. ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF VARIOUS EXPLANATIONS 
ON THE CASE OF AL-SHABAAB 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the author will use the theoretical arguments by the authors in 
Table 1 and apply them to major chronological events before and after 7/11 in order to 
clearly understand what variables led to the success of Al-Shabaab’s first transnational 
attacks in Kampala, Uganda.  Also, the author will provide empirical evidence from 2006 
to date to support the claim made in this study and answer his thesis research question: 
what factors contributed to the success of the transnational activity that happened 
approximately 600 miles away from Somalia’s nearest border?51   
First, the author will explain how, prior to 7/11, Uganda’s role as a key player in 
AMISOM was a catalyst to the events that led to the bombings in Kampala. Second, the 
author will show how Uganda’s military presence in Somalia is perceived as a 
continuation of foreign military occupation, causing military repression. This will be 
illustrated by a series of warnings and promises of retaliation made by Al-Shabaab 
against what it perceived as the killing of Muslims in Mogadishu by AMISOM troops. 
Third, the author will show that Al-Shabaab’s embrace of foreign fighters was a turning 
point that made their threats credible, and then provide evidence of Al-Shabaab 
successfully recruiting Ugandans into its rank and file. Also, the author will demonstrate 
how, after 7/11, the local Ugandans, as foreign fighters recruited by Al-Shabaab, were 
crucial in the success of an entirely transnational terrorist attack. Notably, the author will 
show the use of Kenya as a transit route for the potent group because it would be difficult 
for Uganda to minimize Al-Shabaab’s transnational ability without cooperation from the 
Kenyan government. Furthermore, evidence will be presented for how the Uganda-Kenya 
border is porous when it comes to the terrorists crossing with armaments to launch an 
attack. Lastly, the author will show that there is no evidence that aligns the Somali 
                                                 
51 Christopher Harnisch, “Al Shabaab’s First International Strike: Analysis of the July 11 Uganda 
Bombings,” Critical Threats, July 14, 2010, http://www.criticalthreats.org/somalia/Al-Shabaabs-first-
international-strike-analysis-july-11-uganda-bombings-july-14–2010–4532 (accessed July 05, 2011). 
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community in Uganda with the notorious terrorist group. This chapter goes on to analyze 
the major event(s) and variable(s) that led to the twin bombings on 7/11. 
The findings indicate that the recruitment of Ugandans was a key factor in the 
success of the 7/11 bombings. The originally recruited Ugandan, Issa Luyima, recruited 
his brothers and formed a local franchised cell in Uganda, facilitated by an Al-Shabaab 
cell in East Africa, and was responsible for the mayhem of 7/11. This franchised cell, 
organic to Al-Shabaab’s Saleh Nabhan Brigade,52  was a sufficient factor in the Kampala 
bombings. Also, members of the franchised cell were quite familiar with the city of 
Kampala and freely moved across the Uganda–Kenya border without detection. In 
addition, the cell members lived anonymously within the Uganda population until their 
arrest. Therefore, successful recruitment of Ugandans was a key contributor to the 
success of the 7/11 bombings. On the other hand, the porous border was a necessary 
condition for the success of the 7/11 bombings. The entire planning of the operation 
would be impossible for the perpetrators if they had no way to manipulate the border 
crossing posts and transport the required materials that were used. This makes the porous 
border the most important factor in the success of Al-Shabaab on 7/11, because if Al-
Shabaab had failed in recruiting Ugandans, other people from the Somali community (or 
from some other group) would have done the job. The author will do further analysis of 
the findings by applying a modified “Mystic Diamond” model. Finally, to answer his 
second research question, the author will recommend feasible strategies derived from the 
model that Uganda can adopt to minimize the security dilemma before drawing overall 
conclusions. 
B. BEFORE 7/11 
This period is overshadowed by the rise of Al-Shabaab, especially after the 
invasion of Ethiopian troops in December 2006, as noted earlier. This resulted in a 
                                                 
52 Saleh Nabhan Brigade was formed in Somalia by terrorists after the death of Al-Qaeda member 
Nabhan Saleh in 2009, who was among the masterminds of the two U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi and 
Dar es salaam in 1998. See Bill Roggio, “Uganda Attack Carried out by Shabaab Cell Named after Slain 
Al-Qaeda Leader,” The Long war Journal, July 15, 2010, 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/07/shabaab_cell_that_ca.php#ixzz1IxFJKXnW (accessed 
June 22, 2011). 
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complex insurgency that created preconditions which, in turn, dictated the courses of 
action to be taken by the international community against Al-Shabaab.53  The weak TFG 
in the center of this episode—constrained in Baidoa, Western Somalia, in 2006, and later 
shifted to Mogadishu—was at high risk of collapsing in its infant stage.54  The 
international community could not let the TFG collapse. Thus, in February 2007 under 
United Nations (UN) Security Resolution 1744, Uganda was tasked by the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a seven member state bloc 
(Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Sudan, Somalia Eritrea and Djibouti) under the authorization 
of the AU, to head AMISOM.55  This put Uganda in the spotlight of Al-Shabaab. 
1. Expression of Military Repression 
Uganda’s intervention was a catalyst that saw Al-Shabaab start to mobilize and 
encourage youth from Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda to join its established training 
camps.56  Moreover, in 2008 Al-Shabaab initiated political strategies to gain legitimacy by 
engaging local clan leaders and providing essential services to locals in Southern and 
Central Somalia.57  This is why David Shinn asserts that “Al-Shabaab filled a political 
vacuum and there is not yet any equivalent, opposing force to challenge its control.”58  
During the same period, Al-Shabaab felt threatened by the presence of peacekeepers, so 
the group then declared attacks against “imperialists and Christian forces” threatening 
Somalia, namely the U.S., Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, and Kenya.59  This was a period in  
 
                                                 
53 Bronwyn E. Bruton, “Somalia A New Approach,” Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special 
Report no. 52 (March 2010), 08. 
54 ICG, “Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead,” Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing N°.45 (January 26, 
2007), 12, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-
africa/somalia/B045%20Somalia%20The%20Tough%20Part%20Is%20Ahead.pdf (accessed December 12, 
2010). 
55 Dagne, “Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace,” 8, 19. 
56 Ibid., 12. 
57 Taarnby and Hallundbaeks, “Al-Shabaab, the Internationalization of Militant Islamism in Somalia 
and the Implications for Radicalisation Processes in Europe,” 16. 
58 Shinn, “Al Shabaab’s Foreign Threat to Somalia,” 214. 
59 Taarnby and Hallundbaeks, “Al-Shabaab, the Internationalization of Militant Islamism in Somalia 
and the Implications for Radicalisation Processes in Europe,” 13. 
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which Al-Shabaab gained support from radicals in the diaspora to rally against Uganda 
because it was viewed as a one-sided peacekeeping force used for combat in favor of the 
TFG.60   
Immediately after 7/11, Al-Shabaab accused Ugandan troops of military 
repression in a statement released on the Internet that read as follows: 
The enmity of the crusaders [AMISOM] has reached such a level that they 
bombard the densely populated areas of the Muslims with approximately 
300 mortars a day….families are massacred, children are orphaned, 
women are widowed and close to two million Muslims have been 
displaced.61  
Also, there was criticism by international observers of the Ugandan troops’ 
shelling of civilians in Mogadishu in reaction to the attacks launched by Al-Shabaab from 
within the population.62  
However, the claim of military repression on its own cannot explain the timings 
of the 7/11 bombings. Otherwise, Ethiopia would have been struck first, being in the 
proximity of Somalia and believed to have aggressively clashed and removed the Islamist 
militants under the ICU in power in 2006. Therefore, the author argues that the 
intervention of Uganda, even though it was seen as military repression, was a reactant 
that made Al-Shabaab more aggressive. Max Fisher, a foreign affairs and national 
security analyst, explains that terrorist attacks by a foreign terrorist group are defensive 
and applied in circumstances where an insurgent is unable to challenge his adversary in 
combat.63  In addition, insurgencies have frequently used times when there is a “foreign 
military” occupation in their home country to advance their ideology. For instance, in the 
1960s the African National Congress (ANC) developed a military wing for the sole 
                                                 
60 Bruton, “Somalia A New Approach,” 23. 
61 Will Hartely, “JTIC Country Briefing–Somalia,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, 
September 01, 2010, 19, 
http://jtic.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/janesdata/data/jtic/cb/Somalia/Somalia%20CT%20environment_010
92010.pdf (accessed June 23, 2011). 
62 Hartely, “JTIC Country Briefing–Somalia,” 19. 
63 Max Fisher, “Why Al-Shabaab Would Attack in Uganda,” July 12, 2010, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2010/07/why-Al-Shabaab-would-attack-in-uganda/59551/ 
(accessed November 20, 2010). 
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purpose of violently overcoming the supremacy of white people.64  Also, one of the 
reasons why Lashker-e-Taiba (LeT) carries out attacks against India (like that in Mumbai 
in 2008) is to liberate Muslims under Hindu oppression and counter the widening U.S. 
footprint in India.65  Yet, while Hindu oppression and a widening U.S. footprint may 
motivate transnational attacks carried out inside India, they do not explain the factors that 
enable LeT to carry out attacks. 
2. Recruitment of Foreigners Including Ugandans, 2009–2010 
In early 2009, the continued AMISOM troop support to the TFG ushered in 
elections in February that saw Sharif Sheik Ahmed, a former leader of ARS, elected 
president of Somalia.66  This resulted in Al-Shabaab imposing Sharia law in most of the 
regions under its control and mobilizing Islamists in the diaspora to join its ranks to 
continue attacks against AMISOM and TFG troops.67  By July 2010, twenty-six Ugandan 
troops had been killed in Somalia.68  
In spring 2009, there was an influx of foreign fighters, also known as 
“Muhajirin,” from the neighboring countries of Tanzania and Kenya, and from Uganda, 
including Uganda’s Issa Luyima.69  It was only a matter of time before foreign fighters 
would be used for attacks in their own countries. RAND70  notes that “foreign combatants 
contribute to the insurgents’ goal of internationalizing their armed struggle…”71  Indeed, 
                                                 
64 Paul Rich, Insurgency, Terrorism and the Apartheid System in South Africa, in Terrorism in Africa, 
ed. Martha Crenshaw (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1994), 335–352. 
65 Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past Operations and Future Prospects,” National Security Studies 
Program Policy Paper, April 2011, 2. 
66 Curran, “Global Ambitions: An Analysis of Al-Shabaab’s  Evolving Rhetoric.” 
67 Taarnby and Hallundbaeks, “Al-Shabaab, the Internationalization of Militant Islamism in Somalia 
and the Implications for Radicalisation Processes in Europe,” 17. 
68 Dagne, “Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace,” 9. 
69 Taarnby and Hallundbaeks, “Al-Shabaab, the Internationalization of Militant Islamism in Somalia 
and the Implications for Radicalisation Processes in Europe,” 26–33. 
70 RAND Corporation is a non-profit institution that helps improve policy and decision making 
through research and analysis. See “RAND Corporation,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAND_Corporation 
(accessed November 21, 2011). 
71 Daniel L. Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau and David Brannan, “Assessing 
The Impact Of External Support,” in Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2001), 96. 
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the presence of foreigners increased attacks against international intervention in 
Mogadishu. For instance, on September 17, 2009, Al-Shabaab executed a well-
coordinated twin bombing of the AMISOM headquarters and the DYNCORP offices in 
Mogadishu.72  From June 2009 to June 2010, 556 terrorist incidents were reported to have 
killed over 1,437 people and wounded 3,408.73  Besides attacks inside Somalia, the 
recruitment of foreign fighters ushered in a time of transnational terrorist threats against 
AMISOM troop-contributing countries. 
3. Early Warning Threats 
Threats of terrorist attacks against Kampala and Bujumbura were featured in a 
statement of October 23, 2009, in which senior Al-Shabaab commander Shaykh Ali 
Mohamed Hussein stressed that “we shall make their people cry… will move our fighting 
to those two cities and we will destroy them.”74  Likewise, on February 1, 2010, the 
group declared in a media release its international ambition to formally align with Al-
Qaeda to wage jihad on the Horn of Africa (HOA), a campaign that would be combined 
with Al-Qaeda’s ideology.75  There was no immediate impact as the group maintained its 
operational activities and political targets inside Somalia. However, on July 9, 2010, just 
two days prior to 7/11, Al-Shabaab “encouraged Islamist militants in Chechnya, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and elsewhere to attack the diplomatic missions of Uganda and Burundi in 
response to their continued support for the TFG.”76  
                                                 
72 Taarnby and Hallundbaeks, “Al-Shabaab, the Internationalization of Militant Islamism in Somalia 
and the Implications for Radicalisation Processes in Europe,” 19–20. 
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(accessed June 28, 2011). 
74 “Al Shabaab: We will Attack Uganda and Burundi,” Newstime Africa, October 23, 2009, 
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75 Tim Pippard, “Al-Shabab’s Agenda in the Wake of the Kampala Suicide Attacks,” Combating 
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76 Pippard, “Al-Shabab’s Agenda in the Wake of the Kampala Suicide Attacks,” 4. Also see “Somali 
Islamist Leader Calls for Uganda, Burundi Embassy Attacks,” People’s Daily Online, July 6, 2010, 
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After several threats, Al-Shabaab demonstrated its increasing operational reach 
when it carried out concurrent suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda on 7/11. The 
targeted locations were the Logogo Rugby Club and an Ethiopian restaurant in Kansanga, 
a Kampala neighborhood as people watched a World Cup soccer final. The group also 
planted suicide vests that were detonated remotely.77  The investigations by Ugandan 
authorities, with assistance from the FBI, acknowledged that evidence pointed to the Al-
Shabaab terrorist organization being responsible for the bombings.78  The attacks echoed 
an escalation of Al-Shabaab’s rhetorical campaign against Uganda that had been 
increasingly consistent in the months prior to 7/11. 
C. AFTER 7/11 
It was evident that Al-Shabaab had stepped onto the international operational 
scene in a statement it released on the Internet on July 14, 2010, that read as follows:  
The bombings were carried out to avenge the actions of the Ugandan 
soldiers serving with AMISOM, the peacekeeping force that has prevented 
Al-Shabaab from overrunning Mogadishu.79  
1. Local Franchised and International Cells 
Events that unfolded after 7/11 clarified that a terrorist cell in East Africa planned 
and facilitated the 7/11 bombings, aided by local Ugandans.80  As Uganda’s police chief 
Major General Kale Kayihura asserted, “The Kampala bombings were planned jointly by 
Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda.”81  
On July 12, 2010, a day after the bombings, Uganda police discovered one 
unexploded “suicide bombing vest,” wired to a mobile phone, and placed in a laptop bag 
                                                 
77 Jamestown Foundation Briefs, “Al-Shabaab Expands Operational Zone with Kampala Bombing- 
But to What End,” 1. 
78 Pippard, “Al-Shabab’s Agenda in the Wake of the Kampala Suicide Attacks,” 4. 
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in the Ice Link Discotheque in Makindye House (ILDMH).82  The vest had the same 
configuration that had been found in the other two targeted locations. The vest was meant 
to be triggered by calling the mobile phone; however, its failure to explode after the 
mobile phone was called several times was a turning point in the investigations because 
of the undeniable technical evidence. After one month of investigation, the evidence 
obtained from the SIM card inside the mobile phone led to the arrest of three Ugandans, 
the principle perpetrators, and one Rwandan.83  
On August 12, 2010, Brigadier James Mugira, the Chief of Military Intelligence, 
UPDF, paraded the perpetrators who acknowledged having masterminded the deadly 
bombings. They were: 
• Mohamud Mugisha, a 24-year-old Rwandan recruited in 2008 in Nairobi, 
Kenya.84  He was picked first to organize the attacks and sent to Uganda, but 
when he identified a safe house in the vicinity where Ugandan soldiers lived, 
Mugisha’s superiors from Kenya reprimanded him for fear of jeopardizing the 
mission.85  
• Mugisha was replaced by Issa Ahmed Luyima, a 33-year-old Ugandan who joined 
Al-Shabaab in 2009 with other foreigners in Baraawe, Somalia, and trained for 
four months.86  With experience gained from fighting alongside Al-Shabaab in 
Mogadishu, Luyima was chosen by Hanif Jabir, a senior Al-Shabaab member, to 
carry out the Kampala bombings.87  As Luyima attested, "I planned the attacks, 
received suicide bombers and harbored them, and kept the gadgets that were 
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used."88  This implies that the suicide bombers were not from the Somali 
community that had lived in Uganda for decades.  In addition, when some of the 
suicide bombers abandoned the mission and went back to Somalia, Luyima 
recruited his 30-year old young brother, Edris Nsubuga. 
• Edris Nsubuga is said to have accompanied a Somali suicide bomber to the 
Kyadondo Rugby Club in Lugogo, which was packed with an estimated 5,000 
innocent civilians.89  After the suicide bomber blew up, Nsubuga used his mobile 
phone remotely to trigger the second device at the same location.90  The two 
bombs at this location accounted for the highest number of fatalities, including 
Nate Hern, a U.S. citizen.91  
• Hassan Haruna Luyima, another Ugandan, dropped off a Kenyan suicide bomber 
at the Ethiopian Village restaurant in the suburb of Kansanga where the rest of the 
fatalities took place.92  Hassan was also responsible for carrying out a fourth 
bombing using a suicide-bomb vest at the ILDMH, as previously mentioned. This 
was the vest that failed to detonate and gave up intelligence used to apprehend the 
culprits.93  
The three Ugandans formed a local franchised cell that was facilitated by an East 
African cell called “Saleh Nabhan Brigade,” named after Al-Qaeda member Saleh 
Nabhan, who was killed by U.S. Special Forces in a raid on September 14, 2009.94  
Prior to 7/11, there were obvious terrorist threats, as noted earlier, but without 
local Ugandans the threats were empty because at that time Al-Shabaab’s ability was 
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limited. Therefore, the theoretical argument of active or passive support from the 
indigenous population visa vis the success of a foreign terrorist group holds in this case. 
Paul Rich argues that in the 1960s the ANC succeeded because of its tactics of influence 
over the population in order to attain endless support from them; thus, the population was 
able to hide ANC operatives (who had trained outside South Africa) from 
countermeasures from the ruling regime.95  At the peak of the apartheid violence, 
operatives penetrated the population to the extent of planting bombs in dust bins outside 
shopping malls. In addition, homegrown cells mobilized the populace to join in the 
struggle against the regime by that time; thus, the ANC was able to successfully continue 
with its terror operations.  As a result, murders, car bombings, and targeted assassinations 
were committed for political reasons—for instance, the 1983 Church Street bombing that 
killed 16 civilians and wounded 130 people.96  Recruitment of Ugandans was similarly 
crucial to the success of 7/11. 
After 7/11, several Al-Shabaab facilitators and coordinators were arrested in 
neighboring Kenya and Tanzania. Among them was the “number two Al-Qaeda operative 
in East Africa, Omar Awadh Omar, a car dealer-business man”97 , and al-Amin Kimathi, a 
“Kenyan human rights activist” who facilitated and coordinated the bombings.98  Also,  
Hijar Seleman Nyamadondo was arrested, a 31-year-old Tanzanian who was extradited to 
Uganda in February 2011. As Mr. Abbas Byakagaba, the chief of Uganda’s police anti-
terrorism unit explains, "he is one of the key people who smuggled the three bombs … 
into Uganda."99  
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Lastly, 33-year-old Muhammed Ali Muhammed, was said to have facilitated and 
accommodated the suicide bombers in Nairobi, Kenya. His arrest was another a step 
toward bringing the culprits to justice.100  He was extradited to Uganda on July 1, 2011, 
after being arrested in Tanga, Tanzania, where he had fled from Kenya shortly after he 
learned the suicide bombers he facilitated had accomplished the mission. Apart from the 
Ugandans who confessed to having carried out the bombings, the arrest of Muhammed 
Ali Muhammed brings the total number of all the accused in connection to 7/11 to 
nineteen: ten Kenyans of Somali origin, four Somalis, a Tanzanian, and a Rwandan.101   
a. Kenya the Transit Route 
It is important to highlight the Kenya connection because all the 
perpetrators of 7/11 entered Uganda via Kenya. Kenya’s proximity to Somalia has made 
it easier for militants to move into and from Somalia for decades. One example is in 
February 1993 when the first Al-Qaeda militants from Peshawar, Pakistan, went through 
Kenya on their way to Somalia.102  Kenya is a financial conduit for the Al-Shabaab 
terrorist group as well, as it is reported that some members of the group have been 
receiving $80,000 per month through the Eritrean Embassy in Nairobi for almost a 
decade.103  Therefore, terrorists probably feel safe making transactions and movements 
through Kenya. This may be the reason why shortly after the Kampala bombings, Issa 
Luyima fled to Mombasa, Kenya, and later was extradited to Uganda.104  According to 
Kenya’s anti-terrorism police, Issa was harbored by Kenyan Salmin Mohammed Khamis, 
alleged to be an Al-Qaeda operative connected to the November 2002 Mombasa 
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attacks.105  On August 11, 2010, Nicholas Kamwende acknowledged that Khamis was 
charged with hiding three Ugandans involved in the Kampala bombings. Not only 
civilians, but also Kenyan policemen, have aided Al-Shabaab militants in accomplishing 
their missions. After his arrest, in a press conference Issa Luyima said "Kenyan 
policemen, especially [those from] the Somali tribe, helped us to cross from Somalia to 
Kenya and from Kenya to Uganda… our bosses communicated to them and they easily 
let us through."106  Moreover, Mugisha also revealed that when he was arrested in Kenya, 
one of the Al-Shabaab leaders rang a senior Kenyan police officer and the officer drove 
Mugisha to the Uganda–Kenya border and then assisted him in crossing to Uganda.107   
2. Porous Border 
A porous border does not necessarily mean that there is no border control. 
However, as long as border posts can be manipulated by militants and bombs/bomb 
materials transported from one side to the other, then it can be considered porous. One of 
the arguments in the literature is that East African corridors are porous and subject to 
little control, and this has aided transnational attacks. Al-Qaeda, for instance, was present 
in Sudan since 2004 and moved freely across East Africa’s borders until it executed the 
1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.108  
In Uganda, the concern over not enough border control is not new. In 2006, 
Uganda was an auspicious route for narcotics en route to Europe and Asia, with Busia 
said to be an entrance point from Kenya.109  Likewise, the movement of arms from 
Somalia through Kenya was a concern, especially when these arms got into the hands of 
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the Karamajong warriors in North-Eastern Uganda.110  This is worsened by the difficulty 
in controlling the movement of Somalis in East Africa. As Shinn attests, “there is no 
capacity to track the movement in and out of the Somali Diaspora in Africa….”111  In 
January 2007, the Kenyan government closed its part of entry with Southern Somalia to 
prevent Al-Shabaab militants from crossing over into Kenya.112  However, this has never 
stopped militants from disguising themselves as refugees and crossing into Kenya. In 
particular, many former leaders of the ICU were seen in many places including Eastleigh, 
a neighborhood in Nairobi and home to many Somalis.113  
Insufficient border control with no computerized networks to manage the 
immigration process has led to cross-border skirmishes since 7/11. Bus transport on 
routes between Nairobi and Kampala has proven to be one of the ways devices, materials, 
and Islamist militants cross over into Uganda from Kenya. For example, on December 
10, 2010, bomb-making materials were seized on a Kampala-to-Nairobi bus in Uganda at 
the bus terminal in Kampala.114  Two days later, on December 12, 2010, an explosive 
believed to have been planted by Al-Shabaab went off in the Kampala coach terminal in 
Nairobi (the bomb was intended to go off in Kampala, Uganda), killing three and injuring 
thirty-nine people.115  
As noted, porous borders have been exploited by many terrorists to achieve their 
goals for a long time. For instance, during the apartheid era in the mid-1970s, the ANC 
had access to safe havens in Uganda, Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique (among others), 
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where their leaders recruited, trained, and planned for future actions.116  The sabotage 
attacks inside South Africa against the white regime were successful because of the 
largely uncontrolled borders, such as the Mozambique border, which were susceptible to 
ANC guerrillas. This helped them to access preferred targets like the “Natal Coastal 
Railway, where a bomb was planted in June 1981 between Felixton and Mzingwenya, 
South Africa.”117  The operatives used to cross easily from their sanctuaries in Angola, 
Mozambique, and other African nations. 
Foreign jihadists have used Uganda to join Al-Shabaab in Somalia. In April 2009, 
Bille Ilias Mohammed, a Swede of Somali origin, first attempted to use Uganda to enter 
Somalia in March 2009 and later succeeded in late April 2009.118  Similarly, on January 
28, 2011, three Somalis were arrested trying to enter Uganda at the Busia border, namely 
Abudala Karim, Abed Jamar Jamal Muhammed, and Muhammed Abudinasia.119  The 
Uganda-Kenya border will doubtless continue to be accessed by many, since the two 
countries are both members of the East African Community (EAC) with no visa required 
as long as one is a citizen of either country. 
3. Somali Community in Uganda 
The Somali community refers to Somalis living in Uganda for many years prior to 
7/11. Somalis have continued to live in Uganda since the 1980s, and have integrated into 
Uganda’s business forum.120  For more than two decades Somali businessmen are said to 
have gradually risen in Uganda’s transport sector from being fuel-truck drivers (from 
Mombasa to Kampala) to owning their own bus transport companies and fuel stations 
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(among others). Today, Kisenyi (a neighborhood in Kampala) is famously known as a 
place for Somalis who live like ordinary Ugandans and do not depend on UNHCR. 
After the overthrow of the Said Barre regime resulted in the internal displacement 
of two million Somalis and 800,000 refugees to neighboring countries, numerous Somalis 
fled to Uganda.121   The UN intervention in 1992 did not stop Somalis from seeking 
asylum in neighboring countries or industrialized countries around the world.122  Notably, 
with the threat of Al-Shabaab, many Somalis continued to leave their home country and 
sought refuge in neighboring countries. Table 3 shows the size of the refugee influx in the 
six months before 7/11, from January to June 2010. 
 
 
Table 3.   Refugee Influx and Total Number of Refugees per Country in the 
Region.123  
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The Somali influx into Uganda is relatively high for a period of six months; this 
implies that, on average, over 300 Somalis entered Uganda each month without Uganda’s 
consent. Herewith is an assumption that the number of the Somali refugee influx was the 
same per month into Uganda during the six months. Despite the number of refugees 
(counted and uncounted) that may have entered Uganda, thousands more flooded into 
Kenya and Ethiopia, among other countries in the region, as shown in Table 3. 
There is no evidence against the Somali community in Uganda for any kind of 
support to Al-Shabaab. However, in the wake of the 7/11 bombings, Ugandan police did 
arrest four Somalis who entered Uganda in connection with the bombings.124  Besides 
that, in one of the 7/11 bombing locations—the Logogo Rugby grounds—the suicide 
bomber was identified as a Somali, but had just infiltrated into Uganda under the 
directions of Issa Luyima for the execution of the mission.125  
Here, it is worth mentioning the Somali community in neighboring Kenya given 
the free movement of people between the two EAC state members, as noted earlier. 
Indeed, since 7/11 Kenyan police have arrested and extradited ten Kenyan Muslims of 
Somali origin who supported the Kampala bombings.126   
It is reported that the Somalis in neighboring Kenya have joined the Al-Shabaab 
ranks.127  There is a large Somali community in Eastleigh, a neighborhood in Nairobi, 
Kenya, where radical preachers recruit and raise funds for Al-Shabaab.128  As Nicholas 
Kamwende, the anti-terrorism police chief of Kenya has said:  
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Eastleigh provides the best grounds for recruitment… Eastleigh is a copy 
of Mogadishu, said Mohamed Omar Dalha, Somalia’s social affairs 
minister…everything that happens in Mogadishu happens in Eastleigh, 
except the fighting.129  
It is also known that “Somali militants freely travel to Nairobi to raise funds, 
recruit, and treat wounded fighters, according to U.N. and Kenyan security officials.”130  
Therefore, Uganda’s strategy to minimize the Somali influx must accommodate 
international efforts to accurately identify the culprits. 
D. ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS 
Al-Shabaab portrayed the intervention of Ugandan troops into Somalia as a 
foreign military repression against Muslims in Somalia. This attracted foreign Islamists 
who volunteered to leave their comfort zones in the region and join Al-Shabaab. The 
foreign fighters were more committed to the ideological ambition of the group to operate 
outside Somalia.  This is why, during 2009-2010, the influence of foreign fighters 
changed the game and started Internet threats against AMISOM troop-contributing 
countries. The recruitment of Ugandans was crucial to the credibility of the threats. All 
three apprehended Ugandans had clear information about the targets since they had 
resided in Kampala, so ground work was easy in terms of selecting the targets, concealing 
the suicide bombers, and maneuvering in order to avoid security organizations. This was 
like the attack on November 26, 2008, when LeT terrorists succeeded in striking in 
Mumbai, India, and left 172 dead and 248 people injured; operatives had done thorough 
ground work.131  LeT had sufficient information about the targeted locations as chief 
terrorist Sajid Mir of LeT “had spent two years using a Pakistani-American operative 
named David Coleman Headley to conduct meticulous reconnaissance on Mumbai.”132  
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According to eye witnesses at the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel in Mumbai, the terrorists knew 
even hidden doors and corners of the hotel.133  
The perpetrators of 7/11 lived anonymously among fellow Ugandans without 
anybody suspecting them of any connection with Al-Shabaab. In addition, free movement 
across the border at Busia, Uganda, enabled the perpetrators to cross and transport all 
their necessary materials without detection. Therefore, the successful recruitment of the 
local Ugandan cell, supported by an international network and porous borders, were the 
factors that contributed to the success of the 7/11 bombings. There may be other factors 
that may have contributed to the success of the 7/11 bombings; however, some of the 
information from the Ugandan authority and FBI has remained classified. 
In such transnational terrorist attacks, the movement of perpetrators and any 
logistical item to be used in the attack must cross borders. This is because a transnational 
terrorist attack is planned from one country and carried out in another country. Therefore, 
this makes a porous border in the case of Al-Shabaab’s first transnational bombings a 
necessary condition. Whereas other factors, like foreign fighters and franchised cells, are 
also important, if they cannot infiltrate into the targeted country, then it may be difficult 
to carry out a transnational terrorist attack. On the other hand, if Al-Shabaab operatives 
can infiltrate the targeted country, they may succeed. 
Al-Shabaab terrorists are not fighting for political space in Uganda, and the group 
is not about to wage an insurgency. However, the local cells can be tempted to build an 
insurgent group with time. For this reason, the successful recruitment of Ugandans who 
lived anonymously among the population with external logistical support should be a 
concern, as depicted in the “Mystic Diamond” model shown in Figure 3. The model 
offers a rational and complete counterinsurgent strategy for a state apparatus that has to 
counter terrorists that have infiltrated the population, so that the terrorists can be isolated 
and eliminated. 
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Figure 3.   Gordon McCormick’s “Mystic Diamond” Counterinsurgency Model.134  
The “Mystic Diamond” establishes a framework that describes the interaction 
between state, terrorists, the local population, and international actors. Uganda can apply 
the model efficiently to limit Al-Shabaab’s footprint in Uganda. Uganda as a state has the 
force advantage with the structured security apparatuses of both the army and police. Yet, 
the state suffers from a lack of information because it is difficult to detect terrorists 
implanted in the indigenous population. The terrorists have the advantage of watching 
any security establishment and infrastructure that may be critical targets. As noted earlier, 
the side with the information advantage will always be victorious. 
Minimizing the threat is achieved by identifying terrorists/insurgents, and this is 
done by working with the population, thus creating an optimal internal environment 
where elements of the population will not betray their own government. The population is 
where the insurgency gets such logistical support as sanctuaries, finances, etc., so the 
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government has to put its center of emphasis on the population in order to fight the 
insurgency. Once terrorists are able to infiltrate the population, then the government has 
to apply the strategies implied by the Mystic Diamond. 
The government can apply five strategies. First, the government has to establish 
control over the indigenous population in order to (re)gain legitimacy and credibility. 
Control is defined as “the ability to see everything in one’s area of operation that might 
pose a threat to security and the ability to influence what is seen.”135  This will enable the 
government to acquire vital and actionable intelligence to counter any terrorist activities. 
According toJohn Paul Vann, a military strategist: 
We need intelligence from the local civilians and soldiers from the area who 
 understand the language, customs, and the dynamics of the local situation, who 
 can easily point out strangers in the area even though they speak the same 
 language…136  
Secondly, the government has to weaken the relationship between terrorists and 
the population. This will undermine any terrorist activities in the eyes of the population. 
The third strategy is direct confrontation with the terrorists. This can only be done when 
terrorist operatives are identified and only after intelligence is obtained by applying the 
first and second strategies. The fourth strategy is targeting the terrorists’ external support 
from the international community. Therefore, the government has to work hand-in-hand 
with relevant international actors to impose sanctions and arrest the facilitators of 
terrorists. The fifth strategy is for the government to build legitimacy with the 
international community. This will attract government aid in terms of money, experts, 
and other resources. The strategies should be applied sequentially in order to minimize 
the security threat from the terrorists or insurgents; however, strategies four and five can 
be simultaneously applied with the first three strategies. Also, depending on the situation, 
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these strategies may overlap each other. Within the country, though, it is necessary for 
strategies one and two to be considered first. 
Applying this model to the 7/11 case study, it would yield the model shown in 
Figure 4. As noted earlier, the terrorists who formed the franchised cell, namely the 
principle perpetrators of 7/11 bombings, were local Ugandans supported by some 
individuals who were extradited from the East African sister states of Kenya and 
Tanzania. Some terrorists are probably still hiding among the population. For instance, on 
July 18, 2011, Ugandan police in the Arua district, Uganda, arrested Ssenkuma Issa Ali, 
another Ugandan said to have fought with Al-Shabaab in Doro on the Somalia-Ethiopian 
border for five months.137  
 
Figure 4.   After Modification, the “Mystic Diamond” Depicting Uganda’s Situation. 
On the left side of Figure 4 is the state (Ugandan government) currently faced 
with the Al-Shabaab terrorists (on the right side) who have penetrated the indigenous 
population. The population (at the top) represents the combination of indigenous 
Ugandans and Somalis who have lived in Uganda for several years. Lastly, the lower part 
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of the model is the external environment that includes the external actors and sponsors for 
both Uganda and Al-Shabaab. The international community includes Kenya, the AU, and 
the UN, and in particular the U.S. as the frontier country in combating terrorism. 
The strategies to be adopted are as follows. First, to identify terrorist operatives 
within the population, the government has to win the minds of the population. Andrew 
Krepinevich, Jr., in his book The Army and Vietnam, wrote that “wining the hearts and 
minds of the people is as desirable for the government as it is for the insurgent.”138  This is 
important because if Al-Shabaab with its ideology convinces more Ugandans to want 
Ugandan troops withdraw from Somalia, then the probability of more transnational 
terrorist attacks will be high. This is because the population will provide terrorists with a 
stock of recruits and other forms of support. However, aligning the population with the 
government will assist the security apparatus with timely intelligence to foil terrorist 
activities. As long as the terrorists are estranged from the population, they lose their focus 
and are easily defeated.139  In order to achieve this, the government has to engage the 
population, specifically the Muslim minority, in social and welfare activities. 
The second strategy is not direct confrontation with the terrorists, but constraining 
their environment. In other words, this strategy aims to make it hard for Al-Shabaab 
operatives to move freely all the way from border posts into Kampala. As Krepinevich 
aptly points out, “If denied the ability to move quickly and easily among the population, 
the insurgent will become, to paraphrase Mao, like a fish out of water.”140  Therefore, 
Uganda has to attack Al-Shabaab’s infrastructure inside Uganda by imposing sanctions 
on Al-Shabaab operatives and their supporting businessmen. Attaining this actionable 
intelligence is important. Joel Garreau, a Washington Post reporter asserts that 
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“intelligence is crucial to analyze the network’s links so you can destroy it.”141  Then, with 
actionable intelligence the Ugandan security apparatus can apply the third strategy of 
separating the terrorists from the population by arresting them and prosecuting them for 
terrorism. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the perpetrators of 7/11 received external support 
from the East African Al-Shabaab cell active mostly in Kenya. Therefore, as the fourth 
strategy indicates there is a need to identify the support nodes and pressurize the Kenyan 
government to apprehend terrorists in Kenya. 
Lastly, in strategy five the international community must support Uganda to 
pressurize Kenya into no longer being regarded as a transit route and a safe haven where 
terrorists plan to carry out transnational attacks against Uganda. In addition, the Uganda 
government has to mobilize the international community and the U.S. in particular to step 
up efforts to support AMISOM in terms of logistics, finances, and modern equipment to 
wipe out Al-Shabaab bases in Somalia. This collective effort is needed because terrorist 
activities have defied the sovereignty of many nations. All five strategies can be put into 
practice by the government of Uganda to curtail the terrorist threats. Thus, in relation to 
these strategies, the author will make viable recommendations in Chapter III that Uganda 
can use in order to minimize the Al-Shabaab menace. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Ugandan troop presence in Somalia was enough to set up a platform for 
hostility from Al-Shabaab militants. In 2009, the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and the 
election of Sheikh Ahmed Sharif as president brought about an influx of foreign fighters. 
The foreign fighters were more aligned with the ideology of Al-Shabaab than were local 
fighters, who were divided into ethnic clans. With the influence of “muhajirin”, Al-
Shabaab first issued warnings in late 2009, citing military repression by AMISOM 
troops. However, the threats seemed hollow at the time because suspected that the group 
had recruited Ugandan youths into its ranks. 
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The 7/11 bombings were planned by an East African cell under the Saleh Nabhan 
Brigade that had successfully recruited Ugandan youths. The recruitment of the three 
Ugandans formed a local franchised cell, which was crucial to the success of the 7/11 
bombings in Kampala. This enabled the mission to be carried out without detection or 
suspicion by either Ugandan security organs or the population. Notably, the support came 
from the few individuals from Kenya who transported operatives, accommodated the 
suicide bombers, and supplied all the materials that were used by Al-Shabaab to succeed 
in its first transnational attack. In addition, corrupt security officials in the Kenyan police 
assisted the Ugandan operatives in crossing the border. Herewith is an assumption that 
these corrupt police officers provided terrorists with “genuine” travel documents. 
Likewise, a lack of control at the Ugandan–Kenya border enabled the perpetrators 
to easily cross and transport all the necessary materials required for the attack. Moreover, 
the influx of Somalis into Uganda is high, which may be a significant problem in the 
future should militants seek their support from Somali refugees who have settled in 
Uganda. Also, some indigenous Muslims have felt offended in the wake of the 7/11 
bombings as all the perpetrators were Muslims. However, the main security problem rests 
with neighboring Kenya. Kenya has been identified as a transit route to and from 
Somalia, a place for recruitment and fundraising, and a sanctuary for terrorist cells as 
noted earlier. 
Each of these factors—franchised cell, support network, and porous border—
suggest that Al-Shabaab will continue to pose a great threat to Uganda. Indeed, four days 
after 7/11, on July 15, 2010, Al-Shabaab released audio statements on radio Mogadishu 
threatening further attacks against Uganda. Al-Shabaab insisted that “what has happened 
in Kampala was only the beginning… [we] will keep revenging what your soldiers 
remorselessly did to our people.”142  Tim Pippard, a senior consultant in the security and 
military intelligence practice for IHS Jane’s, argues that Al-Shabaab will continue 
attracting foreign fighters and developing international cells responsible for future attacks 
against Ugandan targets.143  Indeed, as long as Ugandan troops are still in Somalia, 
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Uganda remains at risk of transnational terrorist attacks from Al-Shabaab. The bombings 
were a clear extension of the fighting in Mogadishu and retaliation against the 
deployment of Ugandan troops in Somalia. However, if the strategies derived from the 
Mystic Diamond model as discussed in this chapter are applied, then future execution of 
sporadic, high fatality attacks against Ugandans by Al-Shabaab through a neighboring 
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III. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE 
AREAS OF RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSION 
This thesis highlights the fact that the Al-Shabaab terrorist organization is a 
security threat to Uganda. Al-Shabaab’s first transnational attack on 7/11 was intended to 
intimidate Uganda to stop its critical role with AMSIOM in support of the TFG. 
However, the attacks failed to achieve their objectives, as Uganda is still committed in 
Somalia. 
Little was known about Al-Shabaab before the invasion of ENDF in December 
2006 to oust the ICU.  In the era between 2006 and 2008, Al-Shabaab emerged from the 
wings of the ICU to be the most powerful terrorist organization in Somalia, resisting 
international efforts to stabilize the country. The Ethiopian invasion played into the hands 
of Al-Shabaab, enabling it to rally support from the local populace and Islamists in the 
diaspora.  Indeed, Rob Wise, a research assistant in the Homeland and Security and 
Counterterrorism program at CSIS, asserts that, Al-Shabaab’s “initial period of growth, 
militarization, and radicalization came as a direct result of foreign intervention, 
specifically the Ethiopian invasion.”144  This laid the foundation for the working 
environment in which Ugandan troops world be operating. 
Since 2007, Uganda’s support for the weak central government (TFG) was seen 
by Al-Shabaab as a continuation of the foreign military invasion. The presence of foreign 
fighters suggested to Al-Shabaab the thought of internationalizing its ideology. 
Consequently, the expansion of its locus of violence from the national to transnational 
range exposed the organization to a high degree of competitiveness in terms of resources, 
support from the local populace, the diaspora, etc., thus exposing the group’s 
vulnerabilities. 
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Even though the presence of foreign fighters was an old phenomenon, namely 
several decades old, it materialized into the successful recruitment of Ugandans who 
were the principle perpetrators of the 7/11 bombings. Indeed, the three Ugandans were 
supported and facilitated by an Al-Shabaab cell in East Africa. In addition, the porous 
border at Busia, Uganda, enabled the terrorists to manipulate the security at that 
particular post, as noted earlier. 
It is worth emphasizing that Kenya is instrumental in this case study as it was 
used as a route by the perpetrators of 7/11. Indeed, Kenya is said to be a sanctuary for 
many foreign fighters who belong to Al-Shabaab. 
There are no other transnational attacks that have taken place in Uganda, but Al-
Shabaab has continued to threaten Uganda with other attacks if it does not withdraw its 
troops from Somalia. After 7/11, Ken Menkhaus and Christopher Boucek, experts on 
Somalia affairs, commented that the regional reach of Al-Shabaab is clear—it can strike 
throughout East Africa.145  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
To minimize the transnational threat of Al-Shabaab terrorists in Uganda, it is 
recommended that the Ugandan government do the following:  
• Sensitize the population about activities related to terrorism and 
delegitimize any activity connected to terrorism, as such attacks are not 
common to most African countries. Also, teach people how to identify 
unusual objects, deal with unfamiliar people, etc. In addition, broadcast 
information operation (IO) campaign programs on radio, television, and 
through newspapers and other forms of media as a way of reaching out to 
the community. This can be supported with strong relationships between 
security organs (police and military) so that people are aware of the 
channels in which to contact the authorities. Moreover, telephone lines in 
                                                 
145 Ken Menkhaus and Christopher Boucek, “Terrorism out of Somalia,” Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, September 23, 2010, http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/23/terrorism-out-of-
somalia/g7 (accessed June28, 2011). 
 45 
the form of hotlines should be set up so that someone does not have to 
travel a long distance in order to pass on information related to security 
matters. There must be an adequate, appropriate, and timely response to 
any action or information from the security organs, so that people are not 
scared away when they come up with anything to report about terrorism. 
• Engage the Somali community in Uganda in social and welfare activities 
so that they do not feel isolated. Also, create a mechanism to interact with 
the Muslim minority in an atmosphere that facilitates free sharing of 
information, to include grievances. This will enable authorities to identify 
suspicious persons and be able to inform security organs. 
• Provide psychological training for the security personnel manning the 
border posts. It takes well-trained and skilled personnel to detect criminals 
from their appearance, facial expression, etc. In addition, equip border 
posts with computerized systems that can display personal details of 
individuals crossing into Uganda. 
• Spearhead the establishment of a regional counterterrorism agency for the 
East African Community, where East African countries would share 
intelligence in order to thwart “cross-border terror networks.” 
C. FUTURE AREAS OF RESEARCH 
This case study of Al-Shabaab’s first transnational terrorist attack did not 
concentrate on the fact that the Ugandan youth who carried out the act were from the 
Muslim minority and, may have been motivated by religious fervor. However, there are 
areas of future research that could help the Ugandan government to minimize the threat 
caused by Islamists. Therefore, the author suggests examining the extent of radicalization 
within the Muslim community in Uganda for future research. This would probably enable 
the government to answer some key questions, like why some Ugandans would embark 
on a plan with foreign terrorists to murder fellow citizens. 
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